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Humanitarianism, State Sovereignty and Authoritarian Regime Maintenance in the 
Syrian War 
 
Reinoud Leenders and Kholoud Mansour 
Abstract 
Through a case study of the Syrian crisis since 2011 this article explores how humanitarianism, state sovereignty 
and authoritarian regime maintenance have come to be closely intertwined. While the Syrian regime’s state 
sovereignty claims facilitated its tight control over a massive UN-led humanitarian aid effort, the latter in turn 
became a platform to project and magnify these claims, and to get them confirmed. The article details how the 
Syrian regime’s injection of its state sovereignty claims into a large-scale humanitarian aid effort gave it access 
to critical benefits and resources that fed into its efforts of authoritarian regime maintenance at times of accute 
threats to its survival. Drawing on the notion of state sovereignty as a social construct, it shows that in response 
to the regime’s loss of compliant domestic audiences for its impausible claims, the regime managed to 
compensate by turning its state sovereignty claims to external audiences, primarily by way of its cooperation 
with UN humanitarian agencies and their donors. These findings call for closer attention to assertive ‘sovereign’ 
states in humanitarian crises and civil war generally. They also suggest that is important that the study of the 
international politics of authoritarianism broadens its mostly bilateral focus, and includes cooperation with 
international organisations. 
 
On 22 February 2014, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted a sharply 
worded resolution on the Syrian crisis. Resolution 2139 called on all parties in the conflict to 
allow humanitarian workers to do their work while it strongly condemned those who failed to 
observe this imperative, foremost the Syrian government. Yet Syrian President Bashar al-
Assad responded with glee, and confidently stated that the resolution must be implemented 
“with respect for the principles laid out in the UN charter, international law and the basic 
foundations of humanitarian work, especially state sovereignty and the role of the state, and 
principles of neutrality, transparency and non-politicised assistance.”1  
 
At first glance Assad’s remarks could be taken as grossly out of touch with reality, as proof – 
if any additional proof was needed—of the regime’s disingenuousness, and as yet another 
instance of it coating itself in the formulaic pomp so typical of a stiffly authoritarian regime 
clinging onto an image of reasonableness when its legitimacy long evaporated. Responding to 
another such speech Assad gave in Damascus’ opera house a year earlier, Rami Khoury, a 
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Beirut-based commentator, captured this common perspective by saying: “It was operatic in 
its otherworldly fantasy, unrelated to realities outside the building.”2 
 
In this article we present the argument that the regime’s embrace of humanitarianism and its 
key principles is not necessarily at odds with its blatant flouting of these same principles since 
the onset of the Syrian conflict in March 2011. On the contrary, the regime’s deliberate 
deprivation strategies and untold repression are, disturbingly, mediated by and to a significant 
degree enabled by UN-led humanitarian assistance in the country. From this the international 
humanitarian system emerges as a key vehicle by which the Syrian regime has effectively 
projected and reaffirmed its claims on state sovereignty. In turn, we argue that this helped the 
regime to generate tangible benefits and resources in its wider efforts to persist at all costs. In 
short, the regime’s discursive universe --ridiculed by commentators and Syrian activists alike-
- is intimately related to ‘realities outside the opera building,’ as it has made humanitarianism 
complicit in the regime’s endeavours to withstand mounting challenges since the beginning of 
the conflict in early 2011.  
 
Framing our effort analytically is an attempt to critically combine and, through the Syrian 
case, contribute to three rather dissipated literatures relevant to the study of, respectively, state 
sovereignty, humanitarianism, and authoritarian regime resilience. Accordingly, we answer 
calls to, respectively, “reclaim the dimension of empirical research”3 on state sovereignty and 
“’move down’ from the broad study of authoritarian [international] diffusion to the concrete 
analysis of its constituent mechanisms.”4 
 
We argue, firstly, that the Syrian conflict countered the emergence of contingent or diluted 
state sovereignty in the less developed world, a phenomenon variously welcomed by those 
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advocating humanitarian intervention5 while lamented by those seeing renewed Western 
penetration of the south in its name.6 While the actual erosion of state sovereignty since the 
end of the Cold War remains a matter of dispute, we contend that the Syrian conflict can be 
viewed as an exemplary case supporting those who all along contended that reports of the 
death of state sovereignty were premature at best. Less commonly, though, has it been noted 
that, especially in the context of civil war, state sovereignty can be reinforced by 
appropriating humanitarian organisations and their aid. Quite the contrary, these forces 
usually are viewed as challenging, compromising, or even usurping state sovereignty.7 The 
Syrian case suggests that effective state sovereignty claims at times of armed conflict have 
been catapulted back into the international realm due to the regime’s projection of its 
categorical state sovereignty assertions onto and through the largest UN-led humanitarian 
assistance effort in decades.  
 
Secondly, and echoing a number of scholars who have alluded to governments’ manipulation 
and instrumentalization of nominal state sovereignty,8 we detail how the Syrian regime’s 
injection of its state sovereignty claims into the humanitarian aid effort gave it access to 
critical benefits and resources produced by the ‘humanitarian space’ built by UN agencies and 
International Non-Governmenal Organisations (INGOs). At times of steep challenges against 
it, these benefits and resources were critical to the regime’s resilience. They were accrued 
endogenously to the humanitarian aid provided to some and denied to others, and by way of 
the benefits and perks associated with the regime’s reinforced claims on state sovereignty 
more generally. We suggest that the sheer scale and systematic way by which the Syrian 
regime has pursued such resource mobilization strategies ought to be of interest to a growing 
academic focus on the international dimensions of authoritarian rule.9 Our findings point up 
to the importance of a perspective complementing and transcending the strictly bilateral ties 
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that much of this literature emphasizes, and place authoritarian governance firmly within the 
context of the international system of sovereign states and such regimes’ cooperation with 
international organisations. 
 
Thirdly, the Syrian case builds on the notion of state sovereignty as a social construct.10 We 
argue that in our case study this perspective gains additional pertinence given the Syrian 
regime’s past record of relying on compliant domestic audiences participating in staged rituals 
to the effect of upholding implausible regime claims about its qualities and achievements 
more generally.11 We maintain in this context that the illusory claims of the Syrian regime 
since 2011 no longer draw in a large domestic audience now its naked and brutal repression of 
Syrian citizens has become ubiquitous; in its place the regime’s claim-making and consensual 
pretence has shifted to external audiences comprised of UN humanitarian agencies and donor 
states as the latter reinforced and sustained the Syrian regime’s empirically implausible claims 
on state sovereignty. As often noted, both revolutionary situations and civil war produce 
competing, mutually exclusive claims on state sovereignty.12 Yet the Syrian war suggests that 
authoritarian regimes can be highly successful in selecting and altering relevant audiences to 
uphold their claims. By constructing state sovereignty externally, such regimes are able to 
render largely inconsequential “whether some significant part of the subject population 
honors [its] claim.”13  
  
The article draws on some forty semi-structured interviews with foreign and Syrian aid 
workers, diplomats and donor representatives involved or formerly working in Syria, and with 
Syrian activists, businessmen, journalists and health professionals; most of them requested 
their names to be withheld. For these interviews we made visits to Damascus in November 
2015 and January 2016 but due to the increasingly hazardous conditions in Syria most 
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respondents were contacted outside Syria --in Amman, Gaziantep, Beirut and several 
European capitals, or they were reached via telephone or Skype. In addition, we consulted a 
large amount of aid documents released by UN agencies and humanitarian organisations, 
(Arabic) media reports (including social media) and, where indicated, data derived from the 
Carter Center’s Syria Mapping Project database.14    
 
Syria’s humanitarian crisis and the faltering response 
From Table (1) it would reasonably appear that the prime challenge posed by Syria’s rapidly 
growing humanitarian crisis is that donor countries simply have not been forthcoming enough 
in paying up for the steep costs of aid.  
 
Table 1: UN Humanitarian Assistance to Syria 2012-201615  
 Appeal 
(US$) 
Funds 
received 
Estimated people in 
need (2012-2015) 
Proportion of people in need 
(at date of appeal) reached 
across sectors  
2012 348m 62 % 1.5m (June) 
2.5m (Sept.) 
4m (Dec.) 
n.a. 
2013 1.41bln  68 % 6.8m (April) 36 % 
2014 2.26bln 50 % 9.3m (April) 
10.8m (Aug.) 
12.2m (Nov.) 
60 % 
2015 2.9bln 43 % 13.5m (Oct.) 47 % 
2016 3.2bln 52 % 13.5m (Dec.) 51 % 
 
The UN-led humanitarian effort in Syria –amounting to US$ 5.2bln between 2012-2016-- still 
classifies as the largest humanitarian effort worldwide.16 Yet it is clear that its scope has 
significantly fallen short of meeting needs. This has led UN humanitarian officials to 
continuously call on donor countries to dig deeper in their pockets. Taking a similar 
perspective, OXFAM issued its “fair share index”, naming and shaming wealthy countries for 
their failure to share the burden of required humanitarian assistance in Syria and neighbouring 
countries combined.17 The Syrian government also pointed at funding shortfalls as the main 
cause of the shortcomings of international humanitarian assistance in Syria.18 
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Indeed, funding constraints forced UN agencies to reduce their aid packages, or at times 
suspend them altogether. Yet while acknowledging these financial constraints, reducing the 
UN’s disappointing humanitarian performance in Syria to a lack of financial resources 
provides an incomplete picture at best. Many explanations compete in the margins of the oft-
lamented shortage of funds. Most of these are catered to donor expectations and follow 
standard humanitarian evaluation concerns with the UN’s humanitarian institutional 
architecture and coordination issues. Yet an explanation that places the UN humanitarian 
effort firmly and comprehensively in the context of its relations with the Syrian regime thus 
far has been relatively underdeveloped. 
 
Humanitarian aid in Syria: regime control through sovereignty 
One year into the Syrian conflict it began to dawn on the outside world that a major 
humanitarian catastrophe was unfolding in Syria, and that something needed to be done 
urgently to address it. Yet the Syrian government refused countrywide and unconditional 
access, delayed agreement on the modalities of UN-led operations, and imposed mounting 
conditions on UN agencies and INGOs partnering with them.19 An understanding was 
hammered out between May and August 2012 allowing eight UN agencies and nine INGOs to 
operate inside Syria. Further negotiations over government conditions and restrictions caused 
the “emergency response” under the UN Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan 
(SHARP) and its first appeal for funding to be delayed to the end of that year. Before it 
allowed for stepped-up UN humanitarian operations, the regime made it abundantly clear that 
providing aid was not going to be for free, and that it attached a heavy price to it.  
 
The Syrian regime’s dragging its feet on the humanitarian front should be viewed in the 
threatening international context in which it found itself. Since the summer of 2011 a growing 
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number of (mainly Western and Gulf Arab) countries had been calling for Assad to step 
down. With mounting apprehension the regime looked at developments in Libya where, 
following UNSCR 1970 and 1973 (evoking the “responsibility to protect”), a NATO-led 
coalition imposed a no-fly zone culminating in an international military operation to remove 
Mu’ammar al-Qaddafi. For Syria there was much less appetite to intervene on such a scale. 
Yet by the end of 2012 a large number of countries expressed support to the Syrian National 
Council, the Syrian opposition-in-exile, followed by the recognition of its successor, the 
Syrian National Coalition (SNC), by over 130 countries by December 2012. In short, while 
sovereign aspirants were proliferating inside Syria, the regime had a serious cause for concern 
that the outside world would follow suit and remove it from power.   
 
Against this background, the Syrian regime presented the UN humanitarians --eager to start 
their provision of aid-- with a stiff demand. They were going to be instrumental in its efforts 
to confirm, bolster and project its imagining of and claims on state sovereignty. One senior 
UN official who arrived in Syria in the spring of 2012 recalled how his meetings with Syrian 
state officials transgressed into lectures on UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182 adopted 
in December 1991.20 His Syrian counterparts appeared to know the resolution by heart: 
The sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity of States must 
be fully respected in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. […] The 
affected State has the primary role in the initiation, 
organization, coordination, and implementation of humanitarian assistance 
within its territory. 
 
The resolution was to become a standard reference point for Syrian officials and diplomats 
insisting that the Syrian government was to be fully in charge of international humanitarian 
aid and that the relief effort ought to be premised on unconditional respect for Syrian state 
sovereignty. In view of this, the first four pages of the report by the UN-Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) looking back at achievements under SHARP 
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during its first year repeatedly reiterated and supported the Syrian regime’s exclusive claim to 
state sovereignty.21 These were not mere ritualistic utterances of diplomatic protocol. If the 
UN was to provide humanitarian assistance in Syria, the regime was making sure that its 
endeavours were to be placed under its full control.  
 
It is striking how few INGOs were authorised to work in tandem with the UN agencies in 
Syria. Initially eight such INGOs, already providing assistance to Iraqi refugees, were 
licensed to work on Syria’s emerging crisis. Requests to allow for more INGOs caused their 
number to increase to 16 at the end of that year;22 according to UN officials still grossly 
inadequate to oversee and implement a multi-billion dollar humanitarian assistance program 
under increasingly harrowing conditions.23 Further government restrictions caused these 
INGOs to work in only eight out of Syria’s 12 governorates,24 and they were banned from 
working with local relief organisations except the Syrian Arab Red Crescent Society (SARC).  
 
International humanitarian staff in Syria rotated frequently, thus generating a constant need 
for visas, and prompting sustained opportunities for the regime to provide or, as often as it 
turned out, delay or deny visas in its re-affirmations of this most basic trait of state 
sovereignty. The regime prolonged procedures especially when requested to provide visas to 
nationals from countries supporting the opposition.25 In February 2015 the regime expelled 
two foreign U.N workers ostensibly for negotiating humanitarian access with “terrorist” rebel 
groups in Aleppo.26   
 
Invoking its claims on state sovereignty, the regime imposed further controls over the 
humanitarian effort. First, SARC was given a gatekeeper’s role at the pivot of the UN’s 
humanitarian operations in Syria. It became a mandatory operational partner and focal point 
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for all INGOs registered and operating in the country. Several INGOs, although officially 
registered, never obtained authorization to operate in Syria because they failed to reach an 
agreement with SARC.27 The latter also has been the main implementing partner for UN 
agencies as about 60 percent of UN relief came to be channelled through it.28 The government 
undeniably controls SARC’s central operations. Leaving little ambiguity about this, Syria is 
the only country that has a “state ministry for Red Crescent affairs”. SARC’s president, Abdul 
Rahman Attar, is variously described as a committed humanitarian;29 but he also is a 
successful businessman who made his private fortune thanks to his intimate relations to the 
regime since the 1970s.30 SARC has negotiated considerable leeway to provide humanitarian 
aid, and it has done so with increased professionalism. SARC received credit throughout the 
country for trying to make the best out of an impossible job, and for paying a heavy prize as, 
by 2017, more than 40 of its staff and volunteers were killed.31 Yet humanitarian agencies still 
had to consider SARC as a potential choking point for aid to get through, providing the 
government with powerful leverage in what soon proved to be drawn-out negotiations over 
cross-line and cross-border assistance.32  
 
Under these already debilitating conditions, UN agencies had to select their local 
implementing partners. The latter were limited to government-designated NGOs. Some of the 
initially 107 Syrian charities authorised to partner with UN agencies may be dedicated and 
capable  -- yet this is difficult to assess comprehensively as most UN agencies have not fully 
disclosed with whom exactly they were partnering. Some of these charities --like the Syria 
Trust for Development headed by the First Lady Asma al-Assad, and partnering with the 
UNHCR-- clearly serve the regime’s political objectives.33 Other UN agency partners, like al-
Bustan charitable association, are tightly linked to senior regime incumbents, and have been 
instrumental to the state’s outsourcing of violence to pro-regime militias and irregular 
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forces.34 Al-Bustan is an official partner to UNICEF and the International Organisation for 
Migration (IOM).35 Many government-accredited NGOs and charities ostensibly partnering 
with UN agencies presented themselves in strong support of the regime, dedicating their work 
to the regime and framing their relief in terms of “supporting martyr families” – a reference to 
families of those killed among regime troops.36  
 
All registered Syrian NGOs and charities are subject to intrusive controls by the Ministry of 
Social Affairs and local state authorities. The latter can instantly dismiss their management 
and appoint their own, as indeed happened to charities partnering with UN agencies.37 The 
required government authorization needed for humanitarian work –with or without UN 
agencies-- also caused those Syrian humanitarians and charities not obtaining authorization to 
be subjected to harassment, arrest, prosecution and regime sanctioned killings from the start 
of the conflict.38 The regime’s criminalization of unlicensed aid workers escaping its control 
reached its apex in the regime’s labelling of ‘Syria Civil Defence’ rescue workers (‘the White 
Helmets’) as “terrorists”, and in deliberately targeting them in “two-tap” air strikes.39      
 
Not only did the regime impose its supporters as the UN’s local partners; it parachuted them 
right within the UN agencies operating from Damascus.40 Among senior local staff employed 
by UN agencies were individuals known for their ties to the Syrian secret police 
(mukhabarat) and relatives of senior regime incumbents.41  
 
While tightening its grip on the international aid agencies, the Syrian regime interfered 
directly with UN agencies’ assessments of what aid was needed and where, and to whom it 
was to be delivered. Such began when in the spring of 2012 OCHA carried out a countrywide 
initial needs assessment. Chaperoned by regime minders and security agents, UN assessors 
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visited several governorates but crossed frontlines only a few times.42 State officials pruned 
the report they prepared word-by-word and changed the draft’s use of the word “conflict” into 
“events”, insisted on the use of the term “moving people” instead of internal displacement 
and, most importantly, toned down both the scope and urgency of registered needs.43 The 
experience set the tone for the regime’s sustained effort to determine publicly stated 
humanitarian needs, especially where real needs supposedly clashed with its desire to project 
the image of full state control and where this served the regime’s interest in depriving rebel-
held areas from aid.  
 
Thus, it was only in June 2014 –three years into the conflict—that UN agencies formulated a 
“protection strategy” for civilians especially affected by the conflict, ostensibly because the 
regime was suspicious of the hint of failing state responsibility that the term implies.44 
Furthermore, the World Health Organisation (WHO), working with the Syrian government, 
reportedly understated the initial threat of the spread of polio by excluding Deir az-Zur from a 
vaccination campaign that began in December 2012.45 Implausibly, the WHO responded to 
the accusation by saying that most inhabitants had already left the area; this was at a time that 
the World Food Program provided large-scale aid to the region.46 It was in the same 
governorate that polio re-emerged less than one year later. Syrian health workers operating 
from southern Turkey argued that the WHO’s reliance on Syrian state laboratories caused it to 
underestimate the threat posed by cholera and other contagious diseases, especially when 
originating in rebel-held areas.47 Recent academic research is congruent with their claims.48  
 
OCHA also under-reported the scope and severity of needs in so-called “besieged areas”. In 
February 2015 the UN Secretary General, using OCHA statistics, reported 11 such besieged 
areas in Syria with a combined affected population of 212,000.49 The Syrian American 
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Medical Society (SAMS) conducted its own nation-wide survey using the UN definition for 
‘besieged’.50 For the same period it found 38 additional communities to be under siege while 
it put the total affected population at 640,200. It also concluded that 95 percent of those 
people affected at the time were besieged by Syrian government forces, compared to OCHA’s 
87.5 percent. “Siege Watch,” an initiative by the Dutch peace organisation PAX and the Syria 
Institute, found similar discrepancies between UN data on sieges and information it gathered 
from its own network of local respondents.51 Differences in methodology and limitations in 
obtaining data explain some of the glaring differences in these assessments. When in 
December 2015 a heavily redacted draft of the UN’s Humanitarian Response Plan was 
leaked,52 there remained little doubt that UN agencies allowed the Syrian government to 
dictate and manipulate UN data on the number of besieged people and to coat its own 
responsibility for Syria’s humanitarian disaster in euphemisms and evasive language.53 While 
in 2016 UN figures on sieges were revised upward, large discrepancies with independent 
estimates remained.54 
 
Taking state prerogatives to their extreme, the Syrian government imposed a barrage of 
additional administrative and political obstacles that severely hampered UN-led humanitarian 
efforts or denied access for assistance altogether.55 As Ben Parker, OCHA’s Syria country 
chief until February 2013, stated: “In government-controlled parts of Syria, what, where and 
to whom to distribute aid, and even staff recruitment, have to be negotiated and are sometimes 
dictated.”56 Especially cross-frontline humanitarian assistance was subjected to a host of 
crippling, administrative and politically motivated hurdles. For instance, throughout 2015 
only 23 percent of UN convoy requests reportedly received government approval and less 
than half of these were able to proceed, primarily due to the Syrian government’s refusal to 
give security clearances.57 Especially requests to deliver medical assistance, such as surgical 
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supplies, have been rejected or ignored. Even in cases where approval was granted, regime 
forces routinely removed medical supplies from convoys or refused to let them through.58 In 
some cases they distributed the aid items they had seized to regime supporters and military 
personnel. In December 2013 footage was released of regime aircraft dropping aid parcels 
destined to its besieged troops in the town of Jasem (in Dar’a) – by mistake the parcels fell 
into rebel hands; they carried the WFP logo.59 In May 2015 footage emerged of a rebel-seized 
government base in al-Mastuma, near Idlib storing large volumes of aid bearing the logo of 
UN agencies and the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC).60 The regime also 
conditioned aid agencies’ access to besieged civilians to relief to regime supporters in areas 
that the government could not access. This tit-for-tat approach soon became routine regime 
practice, at first tacitly and then, in a UN-brokered deal in January 2016, unequivocally as UN 
agencies were given momentary access to the regime-besieged town of Madaya only if they 
provided aid to the rebel-besieged towns of Fuaa and Kafraya. When none of its measures to 
control the aid flows satisfied the regime, the latter attacked aid convoys even after giving 
them permission to proceed and in full knowledge of their humanitarian destination. Most 
damagingly, in September 2016 regime helicopters and fixed wing aircraft repeatedly struck 
and destroyed a UN-commissioned SARC convoy west of Aleppo, killing at least 14 aid 
workers.61    
 
Against this background of regime-imposed constraints and outright hostility, UN agencies 
and their partners had to walk a tightrope to operate and reach those in need of assistance. 
This involved a great deal of delicate manoeuvring, continuous negotiation, and engagement 
with all sides of the conflict. Yet the regime’s ultimate control over the UN-led aid effort 
allowed it to consistently prevail and turn humanitarian assistance to its own advantage. The 
regime was able to do so by an array of measures that followed directly from its affirmation 
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and projection of its state sovereignty claims. These measures erected a suffocating 
institutional framework for international relief, imposed local partners, infiltrated UN 
agencies, interfered with the UN’s needs assessments, and enforced a barrage of bureaucratic 
and political hurdles preserving the regime’s discretion in allowing for the daily delivery of 
aid.    
 
Seen through the perspective of much extant literature on humanitarianism, the Syrian 
regime’s ability to impose itself as by far the dominant actor in its relations with UN 
humanitarian agencies would appear as highly remarkable and unexpected. State recipients of 
humanitarian aid in these studies are commonly described as outstripped by much more 
powerful and resourceful humanitarian bureaucracies that dictate the modalities and 
distribution of aid. According to this work, humanitarian agencies extended their 
interventionist prerogatives to a degree that they emerged as quasi-sovereigns and as potent 
instruments of donors’ “reexpansion of the West’s external sovereign frontier.”62 In the 
Syrian war, such assessment barely resonate. Arguably, here quite the reverse has happened. 
Through its loud assertions of state sovereignty, the Syrian regime manoeuvred itself into the 
driving seat and became by far the dominant partner in its relations with UN humanitarian 
agencies and INGOs. At the same time, this development points up to the preoccupation and 
skills of an authoritarian regime to build, sustain and set the terms of cooperation with 
international humanitarian agencies, despite widespread international condemnation of its 
brutality. Accordingly, the Syrian regime’s achievements in this respect appear to cast a new 
light on the ways in which authoritarian regimes are increasingly understood to “use multiple 
forms of international cooperation to sustain their rule.”63 As argued by a budding literature 
on this subject, such international linkages include bilateral ties to other autocratric regimes 
and democratic states alike. The Syrian case strongly suggests that to these bilateral ties 
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should be added authoritarian states’ linkages to international organisations such as the UN’s 
humanitarian agencies and INGOs.     
 
Humanitarian aid, state sovereignty and resource mobilization 
It has been commonly argued that humanitarian principles, and “humanitarian space” to 
meaningfully pursue them, have been under threat in Syria and indeed in many armed 
conflicts elsewhere.64 Yet we are proposing to take this a step further. The regime’s injection 
of its state sovereignty claims into the international humanitarian effort has had major 
consequences in that it generated critical benefits and resources that contributed to the 
regime’s resilience while the odds of the conflict in many ways were and to some extent still 
are stacked against it. Its impact can be discerned endogenously to the delivery of aid and, 
beyond it, by way of the regime’s confirmation and projection of state sovereignty and the 
opportunities this in turn generated for additional resource mobilisation. In short, these 
benefits and resources were accrued through humanitarianism; not by eroding or 
marginalizing its agencies, but with their active cooperation and ostensibly for the sake of 
maintaining a humanitarian space to serve Syrians in need.65 
 -­‐ Humanitarian aid, cash and business opportunities 
As the Syrian regime asserted its sovereign control over humanitarian agencies and their 
work, it siphoned off significant parts of the multibillion-dollar humanitarian enterprise. 
Consequently, the Syrian regime and its supporters generated significant financial resources 
directly from the humanitarian aid effort as it channelled business and financial opportunities 
to its cronies and to privileged members of the country’s remaining business class. UN 
agencies and the INGOs in Damascus transferred significant amounts to SARC and Syrian 
government institutions to pay for salaries, for services, and the use of warehouses. Such 
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payments were often made against highly inflated and rising prices, and benefited state 
institutions that were responsible for, or that financed, large-scale repression.66 Also, the 
country’s crippled and sanctions-ridden banking sector forced UN agencies to rely on large 
cash transfers. There have been concerns that the regime seized on the opaque conditions 
under which such transfers were made. A senior UN official recalled that he was to deliver a 
very large amount of cash to a ministry involved in a large aid operation in the north of the 
country, only to see the money being driven away in a military truck heading for the Ministry 
of Defence.67   
 
Real or potential conflicts of interests riddled the UN humanitarian program throughout, and 
allowed the regime access to additional resources. UN agencies spent large amounts on aid 
projects in collaboration with the Ministry for Social Affairs and the Ministry of Health while 
UN administrative staff and managers facilitating and monitoring such payments included 
former and seconded employees of these same ministries. Between 2012-2015, UN agencies 
in Syria spent USD 642.3m on local procurement,68 contracting state entities and private 
companies. Among contracted companies were numerous enterprises owned by regime 
incumbents, often subject to US and/or EU sanctions, and businessmen with a reputation of 
being extremely close to the Assad family and its associates.69 A senior foreign aid worker 
based in Damascus maintained that when some regime incumbents did not like UN agencies 
and their partners’ choice for procurement they threatened to file corruption charges or they 
caused administrative procedures for humanitarian operations to be put on hold indefinitely.70 
Another source, a Damascus-based Syrian businessman with knowledge of UN procurement 
in Syria, explained a mechanism at work that could be called ‘humanitarian front-running’.71 
Local needs assessments were prepared by Syrian aid workers and then allegedly shared with 
regime incumbents first before being passed on to UN agencies. This placed regime-linked 
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companies in the privileged position to already arrange necessary imports before tenders were 
being held for the mostly urgent supply of such goods. Furthermore, a representative of a 
major donor country formerly based in Damascus reflected that UN agency operatives tended 
to see regime involvement in awarded companies as potential leverage needed to negotiate 
wiggle room vis-à-vis the regime, with the latter gaining a stake in aid projects to proceed.72   
 
UN agencies and donors alike insisted that Syrian partners and providers of relief goods and 
services have been subject to stringent audits for all payments that were made to them. Yet to 
date no such comprehensive audits, if conducted, have been made public. In fact, UN 
agencies and their partners are still to fully disclose data on the amounts Syrian government 
agencies, charities and contractors received and what, exactly, they provided in return.73 Little 
or nothing has been done to determine, address or prevent the potential loss of resources or 
inefficiencies caused by doing business with the regime’s cronies. Donors, for their part, 
rarely raised questions, and never did so publicly, perhaps because they had no interest in 
tarnishing the UN-led aid effort in which they invested so heavily and for which they could 
not think of an alternative.     
 -­‐ Channelling aid 
Regime benefits accrued from its aggressive assertion of sovereignty claims through the 
international humanitarian effort included multiple opportunities to control the very 
distribution of UN relief. While humanitarian assistance overall fell significantly short of 
meeting needs throughout the country, at the end of 2013 it became clear that opposition-held 
areas received far less aid in proportion to the scope and severity of their needs. By holding 
available survey data of December 2013 on needs-response gaps against Syria’s map of 
regime-controlled and opposition-held territories at around the same time, the latter indeed 
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appear as having been far less served.74 In another survey held nearly one year later and for 
three key sectors, a much lower percentage of people-in-need were reached in five 
governorates largely held by the opposition than the countrywide average identified in 
SHARP 2014.75 Raqqa and Idlib --two governorates where opposition forces established their 
tightest control-- scored highest on a scale of the severity of needs across sectors, but they 
also reportedly received the least assistance.  
 
UN agencies and their partners stressed that their assistance is purely needs-driven; aid is duly 
provided when security conditions allow so and when cross-line and/or cross-border 
operations received authorization by the Syrian government. Yet it is clear that the regime 
caused UN agencies to respond inadequately in opposition-held areas. When in early 2014 the 
situation had become intolerable, the UN Security Council responded on 22 February 2014 
with Resolution 2139, which expressed “grave alarm” over “the dire situation of over 3 
million people in hard-to-reach areas” and demanded that all parties, “in particular the Syrian 
authorities”, allowed access for humanitarian aid.  
 
Predictably, the regime continued to wield its nominal sovereignty over its borders by 
denying the UN authorisation to use at least nine border crossings that could have potentially 
served millions of people in need especially in Idlib and Aleppo; most of these crossings were 
not even under the government’s effective control. Several international jurists argued that 
mainly due to the regime’s loss of territorial control unauthorised cross-border assistance by 
the UN would be fully legal.76 Wavering between two opposite positions, UN Emergency 
Relief Coordinator Valerie Amos variously described the Syrian government’s blocking of 
crossborder aid as “arbitrary and unjustified” while earlier judging the regime’s obstructive 
behaviour to be permissible under UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182.77. Amos argued 
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that the Syrian government’s prerogatives in this respect could only be overruled by a special 
Security Council resolution. Consequently, OCHA kept waiting in vain for Syrian 
government authorisation to make full use of the country’s border crossings.  
 
On 14 July 2014, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2165, authorizing UN agencies 
to “use routes across conflict lines” and four border crossings, “with notification to the Syrian 
authorities [..]” In short, for assistance to get through Syria’s frontlines and border crossings, 
formal prior approval by the Syrian government was no longer required. Predictably, the 
Syrian government protested against what it saw as an infringement of its sovereignty.78 Yet 
resolution 2165 failed to prompt a much-needed significant increase of UN-led cross-border 
assistance to reach opposition-held territory. As an internal OCHA evaluation concluded in 
March 2016, “the cross-border opportunity has yet to result in a step-change in the scale and 
reach of the humanitarian operation in Syria.”79 Boxed in by the regime’s measures of control 
and firmly dependent on the regime to operate from Damascus, UN agencies juggled between 
the highly pitched expectations placed on them by the international community to step up 
their aid and the regime’s continuous efforts to manipulate or obstruct their operations inside 
Syria. As a reminder that the international humanitarian agencies’ calculus was to remain 
firmly in favour of the regime, the Syrian government in April 2014 shut down one of the 
operational INGOs in Damascus, Mercy Corps, penalizing it for providing unauthorised 
cross-border aid. Other INGOs operating from Damascus were forced to sign a document 
promising not to get involved in crossborder aid.80  
 
UN aid convoys since resolution 2165 –continuously serving a few hundreds of thousands of 
people-- have been grossly insufficient to meet the large and rising needs in opposition-held 
areas. To understand why this happened we need to address in some more detail the 
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arguments that UN humanitarian officials we interviewed presented in their own defence.81 
Firstly, they countered that aid into Syria – especially food aid- did witness a sharp increase 
immediately following the resolution. Secondly, they argued that following the resolution 
jihadist rebel groups, especially the “Islamic State” (IS), effectively blocked access to the 
areas mostly in need, or such rebel groups were so hostile to humanitarian agencies that 
sending in convoys would have been irresponsible. They concluded that the border crossings 
that had been formally relieved from the need to obtain regime authorization could therefore 
not be fully utilized to significantly augment the delivery of aid.    
 
Figures released by WFP indeed point up to an increase in food supplies six weeks following 
UNSCR 2165, much of it via the border crossings from Turkey.82 However, and as noted in 
internal UN documents, most of this relief went to regime-held areas as residents of rebel-
controlled areas continued to flee to regime territories due to, among other factors, severe 
food shortages.83 Improved aid provision by UN agencies to IDPs therefore went hand in 
hand with regime claims that the ‘loyal’ population under its control augmented. Meanwhile, 
rebel-held areas remained underserved.  
 
The second counter-argument pointing up to the inhibiting role of jihadist rebels only partly 
holds. Humanitarian NGOs operating separately from Turkey said that negotiating 
humanitarian access was cumbersome but still possible when it came to most insurgency 
groups including key jihadist groups such as Ahrar al-Sham and al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-
Nusra and its offshoots.84 Many such armed opposition groups have on several occasions 
obstructed, manipulated and seized humanitarian aid, and they appear to increasingly have 
done so since the battle of Aleppo in late 2016.85 But like many rebel groups elsewhere 
seeking popular support by providing collective goods and attracting aid,86 Syria’s insurgents 
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generally have been keen on the UN to provide aid. This way rebel groups were bend on 
demonstrating their concern for the populations under their control just as they hoped that 
steady aid flows would discourage civilians from fleeing to regime-controlled areas.87  
 
In contrast, the attitude of IS to what it perceives as ‘Western’ aid organisations has been 
sharply more hostile. It kidnapped and executed humanitarian aid workers, demanded full 
control over relief distribution when approached by aid workers, and looted UN relief goods 
for handouts among its own supporters after attaching its own label.88 IS’ inhospitable attitude 
on international humanitarian aid appears to be informed by various considerations, including 
its own unyielding claim on state sovereignty mimicking that of the regime. Regardless, 
NGOs working in neighbouring Iraq reported some success in negotiating humanitarian 
access with local IS leaders,89 and a UN humanitarian negotiator said he had encountered 
willingness among local IS ‘emirs’ in Syria to allow in humanitarian aid without imposing 
draconic conditions.90 Leaving this aside, the argument that jihadist rebels prevented 
humanitarian access since UNSCR 2165 calls for an assessment of IS’ territorial control and 
its ability to obstruct humanitarian access. 
 
Since January 2014 IS had been pushed into the eastern parts of Syria following clashes with 
other rebel groups. By the end of 2014 IS re-established firm control in Raqqa from where it 
expanded to Deir az-Zur, after which it pushed toward the Syrian-Iraqi border and then back 
westwards regaining some territory. These shifting frontlines were consolidated in January 
2015 and were largely left unchanged until Russian airstrikes commenced in September that 
year. All the same, IS could hardly have obstructed access at or from the Bab al-Salam and 
Bab al-Hawa crossings into Aleppo and Idlib where a large number of those in need resided; 
IS had no reported presence in these areas or indeed the main roads leading from them into 
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both governorates and their capitals.91 Much the same applies to al-Ramtha border crossing 
from Jordan where IS had no significant presence.92 
 
In short, the argument of jihadist obstruction of humanitarian access since 2165 may hold for 
IS but henceforth only for the areas under its control in Deir az-Zur and Raqqa, in addition to 
pockets of territory westward. Indeed, this left a UN-estimated 720,000 individuals un- or 
underserved in terms of food aid alone.93 By January 2016 about half of 4.5 million “hard to 
reach” persons in need reportedly lived in IS-controlled areas.94 Yet the argument does not 
hold for much of Aleppo until it was captured by regime forces in December 2016, large parts 
of Idlib, and Dar’a in the south. The question remains, therefore, why the border crossings of 
Bab al-Hawa, Bab al-Salam and al-Ramtha were not used more intensively to reach these 
three areas. The inadequacy of UN crossborder aid following UNSCR 2165 is all the more 
striking when one looks at other, non-UN players such as Mercy Corps and their much greater 
ability in getting humanitarian assistance across Syria’s borders.95 
 
Many humanitarian workers and Syrian activists have expressed strong dismay over how UN 
agencies fell foul to the regime’s manipulations causing aid to be channelled away from rebel-
held areas. Some accused UN agencies of being in cahoots with the regime and of repeating 
its excuses for not letting aid through.96 The continued inadequacy of UN cross-border and –
frontline assistance put the onus on non-UN humanitarian actors, providing aid clandestinely 
from southern Turkey into Syria mostly in collaboration with a large group of Syrian-led aid 
initiatives within rebel-held territories and Syrian Diaspora organisations. Yet while they 
stepped up aid flows, these remained grossly inadequate. One reason is that most donor 
countries do not have the institutional capacity to fully fund and manage numerous NGOs that 
would have to be involved in a humanitarian effort the scale of which is required in Syria. 
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Hence, between 2012 and 2017 more than half of all available funds for humanitarian 
assistance inside Syria has gone through the UN system and the Red Cross/ Red Crescent,97 
much like the worldwide allocation of humanitarian funds generally.98 Syrian NGOs working 
cross-border from Turkey and inside Syria only received a fraction of donor funds.99 
 
By failing to correct its biases in aid delivery associated with regime affirmations of its state 
sovereignty, UN-led humanitarian assistance in Syria has fed into a regime effort to channel 
material resources to its loyal and passive supporters, and kept aid away from its opponents 
and the people they control – callously termed the regime’s “starvation until submission 
campaign”.100 To increasingly war-weary citizens, the message could not have been clearer: if 
they were to value a modicum of everyday normalcy and if they stood a chance for survival, 
the regime was their best bet. In this context, the regime has been quick to claim credit for the 
aid that has been provided, to the extent of downplaying the role of UN agencies and their 
superior budget. In February 2014 the Syrian government even made the absurd claim that it 
accounted for 75 percent of humanitarian aid delivered to the Syrian people compared to 
“barely 25 percent” provided by international organizations.101 That those living in regime-
held areas have been considerably better off can be more accurately attributed to the fact that 
UN humanitarian assistance disproportionately reached them, and far less so residents in 
opposition-held areas, and despite the large differences in needs within both areas.  
 -­‐ Humanitarian assistance within projections of state sovereignty 
On 13 May 2015 UN Resident Humanitarian Coordinator Yaqoub al-Hilo appeared on Syrian 
state television, al-Ikhbariyeh, explaining his mission.102 Following a now familiar script, he 
emphasized that the UN was providing aid in Syria upon the invitation of the Syrian 
government, according to international law and following government approval. Hilo then 
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went on to describe the Syrian state as having been a founding member of the UN among 
other “sovereign and independent nations” and “having been active ever since”: “We 
recognize and respect Syria’s state sovereignty despite the difficult situation and the 
extraordinary circumstances.” Leaving no ambiguity about who he considered to be the true 
legitimate representative of state sovereignty, he described the UN agencies’ headquartering 
in Damascus as “something natural and self-evident”. Hilo also appeared to imply that the 
Syrian government deserved its status representing state sovereignty. He pointed at the fact 
that before the crisis Syria had been the third-largest recipient worldwide of Iraqi refugees, 
“representing humanity at its best”. He furthermore claimed that Syria was in 2015 expected 
to be one of the best performing countries in terms of meeting the UN Millennium Goals for 
development.        
 
While the UN’s emphasis on state sovereignty in the context of its humanitarian aid effort in 
Syria enabled the regime to thrive on and direct significant relief flows, the formal state 
sovereignty the regime projected, reasserted and built through its interactions with UN 
humanitarian agencies fed into its broader strategy to defend, magnify and claim state 
sovereignty generally. As Krasner observed, “rulers seek legal sovereignty because it 
provides them with an array of material and normative resources and benefits” while it 
“imposes no costs.”103 The Syrian regime’s projections of state sovereignty provides a 
detailed example of how these brought it huge amounts of political, diplomatic and material 
support by some influential allies, and became the prime channel through which their aid was 
delivered.  
 
Russia’s main motivation for supporting the Syrian regime does not seem to lay primarily in 
material or even geopolitical interests but in the Syrian regime having positioned itself in a 
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wider contest about the relevance and modalities of state sovereignty.104 To the Russian 
leadership, Syria became a focal point of resistance to Western countries that wish to make 
state sovereignty conditional on how regimes behave toward their own populations. 
Henceforth, it was in emphatic reference to Syrian state sovereignty and in opposition to the 
Security Council “going into regime change mode”105 that Russia vetoed or prevented various 
draft resolutions that proposed more stringent action in Syria, including a draft resolution in 
May 2014 that would have authorised the International Criminal Court to investigate 
allegations over war crimes. Likewise, Russia emphatically framed its dispatch of Russian-
operated warplanes to Syria in August 2015 and their subsequent deployment from a regime-
held airbase in Latakiya by way of a formal bilateral agreement between two sovereign 
states.106  
 
Iran, for its own reasons, also provided significant material and military support including by 
way of “sovereign loans” in excess of US$5 billion,107 and by sending its Revolutionary 
Guards at the behest of the Syrian state. Accordingly, significant material, military and 
diplomatic support were made available through the regime’s clinging onto its state 
sovereignty project. 
 
While UN-led humanitarian assistance in Syria, of course, is neither a direct or sole source of 
the array of benefits that state sovereignty bestowed on the regime, it inadvertently helped to 
bolster the regime’s claims in this respect as the entire aid effort became premised on these 
claims, and celebrated and amplified them. By negotiation and extortion involving the 
international humanitarian effort in Syria, the regime effectively found and seized an 
opportunity to help push its overall campaign to bolster its claims on state sovereignty for the 
purpose of its very survival. As a collateral to the regime’s assertions of state sovereignty –
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and the international community’s complicity in heeding these claims- the Syrian regime 
essentially and successfully glued its very existence to that of the Syrian state to the extent 
that some observers argued that the two can no longer be separated.108 In this view, any 
regime-change scenario would likely bring about a total dissolution of the Syrian state. 
Especially with the rise of IS, it has been by promoting this image that the regime has been 
taking the international community hostage to its maintenance efforts, and that it has been 
effectively countering calls and pressures for it to step down. 
 
The Syrian ‘quasi-state’ at war: acting as if it is sovereign 
In his Syrian state television interview UN Resident Coordinator Yaqoub al-Hilo repeatedly 
pointed at what he saw as the Syrian government’s unceasing capacity to effectuate state 
sovereignty in Syria. He observed that Syrian state institutions are still working as usual, and 
that they provide services to a large number of civilians even in the areas that are not under 
state control. Close to concurring with government claims cited above, Hilo praised in this 
context “the Syrian people” for providing most of the humanitarian assistance in their 
country. Yet in reality, of course, the Syrian regime’s claim to represent state sovereignty 
generally bears little relation to any ‘empirical’ traits of the term, even when reduced to its 
bare essence.  
 
Since the end of 2012 Syria’s ‘state sovereignty’ has become virtually meaningless if 
understood in terms of the state’s exclusive control over its territory, its borders and its 
population, and over the means of coercion. By mid-2015 the regime effectively controlled 
barely 16 percent of the country’s territory and only seven out of 19 official border crossings 
(five with Lebanon and two more, closed, with Turkey)109 -- most of them were held by 
Islamist rebel groups and the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD), which declared its own 
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autonomous government or Kurdish proto-state of Rojava in early 2014. IS proclaimed its 
“caliphate” in the east of the country in June 2014, with its territory reaching far across the 
Iraqi border up to Mosul, mocking both countries’ state sovereignty aspirations. More 
favourably to the Syrian regime but still falling dramatically short of empirical sovereign 
statehood, at the start of 2015 it was estimated to control between 56-72 percent of the 
country’s remaining population.110 Equally devastating from a state sovereignty perspective, 
external interference in Syria has spiralled out of control and the state no longer upholds its 
monopoly on the means of coercion due to its reliance on foreign non-state armed groups, 
including Hizbullah, and a plethora of pro-regime militias. The “militiafication of Assad’s 
Syrian state”111 may well make it impossible for the regime to ever reconstitute the state’s 
monopoly on the means of coercion as a basic trait of positive state sovereignty, even in the 
event that its forces would prevail militarily.  
 
The glaring gap between nominal and positive state sovereignty, of course, is not new or 
unique to Syria.112 In this respect, Syria may only be an extreme or exaggerated case of a 
“quasi-state” wherein international humanitarian assistance among other factors played a 
crucial role in sustaining the myth of state sovereignty. More specifically for Syria, the ways 
by which the regime’s implausible claims have been upheld externally constitute a bitter irony 
given the country’s 2011 uprising that categorically put an end to the regime’s pretence at 
home. Studying pre-uprising authoritarian rule in Syria, Wedeen explored the significance of 
regime propaganda presenting incredible claims about its qualities and achievements.113 She 
argued that citizens do not necessarily believe these claims, nor are they required to do so. 
Rather, the pretence of such beliefs – by ‘acting as if’—enforces habitual obedience, induces 
complicity and structures the terms of both compliance and resistance, to the effect of 
reproducing regime power.  
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Since 2011, such regime enhancing effects have largely evaporated as the regime largely fell 
back on naked and brutal repression, stripped from consensual pretence. As Haughbolle put it, 
“the image is torn, the bond is broken, and the politics of ‘as if’ has been iconoclastically 
undermined.”114 Thus, while many Syrians came out in the streets to reject the regime’s 
pretence and armed groups subsequently pressed their own rivalling sovereignty claims, the 
rest of the world has become complicit in the regime’s grand deception. Wedeens’ analysis on 
Syria should be extended –or be shifted rather-- to the outside world; to the international 
community that continues to embrace the regime’s implausible claims on state sovereignty.115 
Inadvertently or not, UN agencies and their donors have helped to sustain the regime as the 
latter injected its claims on state sovereignty into the international humanitarian effort to 
reach out to its very victims. In the same way Wedeen portrayed the regime’s domestic 
audiences, no one is expected to actually believe as long as one participates and the very real 
effects of false pretence are upheld. Bashar al-Assad remarked in December 2011 when asked 
why Syria bothered to send an ambassador to the United Nations: “Yeah, it’s a game we play. 
It doesn’t mean you believe in it.”116  
 
Whither State Sovereignty, Humanitarianism and Authoritarian Linkages?  
For much of the literature on both state sovereignty and humanitarianism, the Syrian crisis 
would appear as having catapulted state sovereignty unexpectedly back into international 
politics through the humanitarian realm. Of course, those studying the “manipulation” of 
humanitarian aid at times of armed conflict have long recognized that aid recipients and 
protagonists in civil wars can be calculative and assertive players.117 Yet congruent with 
understandings of declining state sovereignty generally, most work in this context came to 
emphasize the manipulations by and challenges emanating from non-state actors, including 
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rebel groups.118 Likewise, this literature underscored the seemingly unstoppable dominance of 
international humanitarian organisations in their dealings with the ‘South’. There may have 
been some good reasons for this perspective, as much of this literature sprang from a focus on 
sub-Saharan Africa’s “complex emergencies” in the 1990s, and their corresponding “weak”, 
“fragile” or “failed” states.119 Yet at the very least the Syrian case calls for caution against 
generalizing this narrative or assuming its unremittant validity. Perhaps the Syrian crisis can 
be viewed as part of a trend wherein state sovereignty is reclaiming its significance in war-
induced humanitarian crises. Indeed, the Syrian regime’s bureaucratic obstruction and 
manipulation of humanitarian aid echoes similarly assertive government action elsewhere, 
including in Darfur at the end of the 2000s,120 and in Sri Lanka at the final stages of its civil 
war, in 2008-9.121 In both cases regimes also embraced loud narratives on state sovereignty to 
control and curb humanitarian agencies. Yet in Darfur and Sri Lanka the state pushed its 
control over humanitarian agencies to the extent that the latter were expelled or felt compelled 
to leave. Such turned these two countries into hard cases of “humanitarian access denial”.122 
As we demonstrated, the Syrian regime similarly pushed its state sovereignty claims onto and 
through international humanitarian agencies as it aimed at fully controlling the aid effort, if 
necessary by denying local humanitarian access. Yet it has been much more determined, and 
cunning, in ensuring that aid workers stayed on and continued to provide an array of benefits, 
and bolster its state sovereignty claims. 
 
As noted earlier, rarely has such a strong positive connection between humanitarian aid and 
state sovereignty been acknowledged.123 Our findings in this respect show more resemblance 
with the ways in which a handful of scholars writing on official development aid took issue 
with the similarly common notion of fading state sovereignty in their field of study.124 As we 
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found for humanitarian assistance in Syria, they argued that development aid assumed, 
reproduced and reinforced recipient states’ sovereignty claims. 
 
The Syrian regime’s resource mobilization strategies, by way of its assertions of state 
sovereignty and cooperation with UN humanitarian agencies and INGOs, suggest an 
important dimension to authoritarian regimes’ international linkages that scholars on the 
subject are yet to explore. Much of the discussion in this field has been preoccupied with 
questions whether other authoritarian states, dubbed “black knights”, engage in active 
“autocracy promotion” abroad, whether overlapping interests of authoritarian regimes rather 
drive their cooperation, or whether authoritarian regimes’ ties to Western democracies equally 
have regime-reinforcing effects.125  The for authoritarian regimes’ self-enhancing qualities of 
cooperation with international organisations, like in the case of Syria’s embrace of UN 
humanitarian agencies, have received scant attention in this literature. Neither have students 
of UN agencies been much interested in how the latter may bolster authoritarian regimes 
while some work did explore the UN’s “democracy” enhancing role.126 From this perspective, 
our case study can be viewed as underscoring a recommendation by one important and 
comprehensive assessment of the literature on the international politics of authoritarianism. 
As suggested by Tansey, the ways in which international organisations act as supporters or 
enablers of authoritarian rule warrant further study.127 Drawing on our findings, we should 
add that a focus on state sovereignty -- deployed in regimes’ cooperation with international 
organisations and being re-affirmed in the process-- gives important clues about and added 
importance to such linkages, and how the latter are played out to reaffirm autocratic rule.  
 
Indirectly, our linking of authoritarian resilience and international organisations, and UN 
humanitarian agencies more specifically, may also help inform a new perspective on the role 
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of “black knights” in propping up other authoritarian regimes. UN agencies bestowed a 
degree of credibility on the Syrian regime’s state sovereignty claims while under these 
conditions their aid provision generated an amount of resources for regime maintenance 
purposes that few individual black knight states could match. Interestingly, these dynamics 
suggest a strong free rider quality to black knight states’ manoeuvring as neither Russia nor 
Iran contributed financially to UN-led humanitarian assistance in Syria and yet aggressively 
pursued regime-reinforcing policies by their behaviour in UN institutions generally.128 
 
Finally, our case study points up to the relevance of a constructivist approach to the study of 
the international politics of authoritarian rule. Scholars of authoritarian regimes’ international 
linkages are right to be dissatisfied with once predominant approaches to authoritarianism that 
analyse such regimes’ durability primarily in domestic terms. Our argument about imagined 
state sovereignty being directed outward to draw in external audiences provides another 
reason to take the international dimensions of authoritarianism seriously. As we 
demonstrated, the Syrian regime effectively upheld its state sovereignty claims, however 
fancy and at odds with empirical sovereignty, by turning to the UN agencies and their donors. 
Such defies notions that the theatre of such sovereignty claims should necessarily or even 
primarily be situated domestically. Indeed, from this perspective there appears to be no reason 
to believe that sovereign states’ “staying ability will ultimately rest on how well they tie into 
[their] people’s hearts.”129 This is not to suggest that the regime’s external sovereignty game, 
or the UN agencies’ central role in it, on its own explains the regime’s resilience. Yet at times 
of civil war and with sharply contested state sovereignty at home, deploying UN humanitarian 
agencies to project and bolster the regime’s sovereignty claims abroad brought the Syrian 
regime crucial respite. It extracted crucial resources from doing so, exactly when the regime’s 
domestic base had never been more precarious.   
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Conclusion 
In this article we have sought to demonstrate the ways in which during the Syrian crisis 
humanitarianism, state sovereignty and authoritarian regime maintenance have become 
closely intertwined. It is the nature and intensity of these linkages that make the Syrian crisis 
so instructive, next to and beyond the vast scale of Syria’s humanitarian needs and the 
inadequate scale of the international response. Within this framework we argued that, firstly, 
while the Syrian regime’s state sovereignty claims facilitated its tight control over the UN-led 
humanitarian aid effort, the latter in turn became a platform to project and magnify these 
claims, and to get them routinely confirmed by UN agencies and their international donors. 
Secondly, we detailed how the Syrian regime’s injection of its state sovereignty claims into 
the humanitarian aid effort gave it access to critical benefits and resources that fed into its 
efforts of authoritarian regime maintenance at times of accute threats to its survival. Thirdly, 
and drawing on the notion of state sovereignty as a social construct, we showed that in 
response to its loss of compliant domestic audiences for its non-credible claims of 
accomplishments, the regime managed to adjust by turning its state sovereignty claims to 
external audiences, primarily by way of its cooperation with UN humanitarian agencies and 
their donors.  
 
We suggested that our findings are relevant for scholarly debates on state sovereignty, 
humanitarianism, and the international dimensions of authoritarian rule. In this context, a 
number of complementary research avenues appear to us as especially worthwhile to pursue. 
Most importantly, the study of humanitarianism and the salience of state sovereignty need to 
better communicate, and establish whether there is a discernible trend wherein, due to 
assertive actions by authoritarian regimes, state sovereignty is reclaiming its significance in 
	   33	  
war-induced humanitarian crises. It would be particularly interesting to establish whether 
there are ‘learning effects’ involving such regimes’ strategic posturings, as some have 
suggested in the case of Sri Lanka and Sudan. Work on the international politics of 
authoritarianism may be instructive in this respect, as it already began to conceptualise and 
explore “authoritarian learning” and “emulation” generally.130 Finally, and from a normative 
or policy perspective, the study of humanitarian negotiations should focus on the 
humanitarian effort in Syria and other cases of re-affirmed state sovereignty in humanitarian 
crises to develop strategies, tactics and tools that equip humanitarian actors to more 
effectively resist and confront authoritarian states’ manipulation and appropriation of aid.        
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